I have been reading an article on intersubjectivity today.
>>> Fuchs, T., & De Jaegher, H. (2009). Enactive intersubjectivity: Participatory sense-making and mutual incorporation. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences, 8: 465-486.
They appropriately point out and summarize the theoretical problems included in the current concept of social cognition. There are four points as follows:
1. 'Inner world' hypothesis
Theory of mind approaches (including both theory theory and simulation theory) conceive of the mental as an inner realm separated from others.
2. Missing interaction
ToM approaches focus on one-way, removed social situations and lack interactions in the second-person perspective.
3. Missing embodiment
Current social cognitive science largely assumes a disembodied sender-rceiver relation between two Cartesian minds. (That's really funny but true)
4. Missing development
There is increasing evidence that the neuronal systems develop only through social interactions. However, the current explanation of social cognition by brain modules or mirror neuron systems remains static.
In the end, we need to describe and explain the intersubjectivity based on embodied interactions. We need an 'embodied theory of mind', so to speak.