Monday, May 28, 2012
Disembodied Cognition?
Our cognition can be disembodied? There is a common thought experiment of this kind.
"Let's start with a fully cognizing human being who is complete in body and mind, and ask what we could subtract while still retaining a cognizing mind."
What do you think?
Getting rid of the legs, the arms, the trunk, the neck... We often come to the 'brain-in-a-vat' conclusion.
Given that "we can directly stimulate the parts of the brain responsible for registering sensory information and thereby, supposedly, have exactly the same experience we would have if our sensory organs were delivering that information."
In fact, however, we can go one step forward to the pure functionalist view: "not only is the body unnecessary for experience and cognition, but we don't even need the brain, as long as we have the program and information running on the right kind of hardware."
Quotations are from:
[Gallagher, S. and Zahavi, D. (2012). The Phenomenological Mind (2nd edition). New York: Routledge, pp.147-8.]
But we should notice that there must be another kind of body and world in either case.
The brain needs the nutrition water to be kept alive, the electrodes which gives the sensory inputs, and the vat to float on. The brain is embodied with electrodes and situated in the vat.
The computer program or artificial neural network also needs to be installed on the appropriate hardware, and the hardware needs to be placed in the real world.
They both need to be embodied and situated, in the same manner as our mind is embodied and situated, in order to realize the cognition.
Sunday, April 29, 2012
Imaginative Self-Transposal
I wrote on this blog before about the similarity between Husserl's notion of Empathy(Einfühlung) and the simulation theory of mind.
Husserl's theory of the Other (4)
http://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/2011/11/husserls-theory-of-other-4.html
There is another Husserlian term called "sich Hineinphantasieren"(imaginative self-transposal), which is parallel to the notion of simulation. Let me quote the following passage by Natalie Depraz (2001).
Imaginative self-transposal deals with the cooperative encounter of our embodied psychic states, as Spiegelberg named this second stage of empathy after Husserl (Spiegelberg, 1971; 1995).
Again, Husserl has a name for such a second stage. He calls it sich Hineinphantasieren. I am here and I imagine I am going there to the place where you are just now; conversely, you are here (the there where I am going to) and you imagine you are going there, to the place where I am (my here). Literally, we are exchanging places at the same time: through imagined kinaesthetic bodily exchanging we are able to exchange our psychic states. Such a second stage is highly embodied, because it relies upon a concretely dynamical spatializing of imagining.
[Depraz, N. (2001). Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterity. in E. Thompson (Ed.), Between Ourselves: Second-person issues in the study of consciousness, p.173]
You perceive the world, have the variety of feelings and think what to do next, being there (my 'there'). In the same way, I perceive the world, have the feelings and think what to do next, being here (your 'there'). The exchangeability of my here and your here is the ground condition of imaginative self-transposal.
Imagine when you are playing chess with your friend, for example. You will easily understand what Husserl meant by the term "sich Hineinphantasieren". You play chess with partner by virtually exchanging the spatial position and also virtually perceiving, feeling and thinking as your partner does.
Husserl's theory of the Other (4)
http://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/2011/11/husserls-theory-of-other-4.html
There is another Husserlian term called "sich Hineinphantasieren"(imaginative self-transposal), which is parallel to the notion of simulation. Let me quote the following passage by Natalie Depraz (2001).
Imaginative self-transposal deals with the cooperative encounter of our embodied psychic states, as Spiegelberg named this second stage of empathy after Husserl (Spiegelberg, 1971; 1995).
Again, Husserl has a name for such a second stage. He calls it sich Hineinphantasieren. I am here and I imagine I am going there to the place where you are just now; conversely, you are here (the there where I am going to) and you imagine you are going there, to the place where I am (my here). Literally, we are exchanging places at the same time: through imagined kinaesthetic bodily exchanging we are able to exchange our psychic states. Such a second stage is highly embodied, because it relies upon a concretely dynamical spatializing of imagining.
[Depraz, N. (2001). Husserlian theory of intersubjectivity as alterity. in E. Thompson (Ed.), Between Ourselves: Second-person issues in the study of consciousness, p.173]
You perceive the world, have the variety of feelings and think what to do next, being there (my 'there'). In the same way, I perceive the world, have the feelings and think what to do next, being here (your 'there'). The exchangeability of my here and your here is the ground condition of imaginative self-transposal.
Imagine when you are playing chess with your friend, for example. You will easily understand what Husserl meant by the term "sich Hineinphantasieren". You play chess with partner by virtually exchanging the spatial position and also virtually perceiving, feeling and thinking as your partner does.
Tuesday, March 13, 2012
Merlau-Ponty on Synesthesia (2)
Merleau-Ponty thinks that we perceive the meaning of the object, where the senses communicate with each other. Through this communication, we hear the sounds with tactile qualities ("soft sound") or we see the objects with softness, warmth or weight ("fragile looking glass"). He says;
By opening up to the structure of the thing, the senses communicate among themselves. We see the rigidity and the fragility of the glass and, when it breaks with a crystal-clear sound, this sound is borne by the visible glass. We see the elasticity of steel, the ductility of molten steel, the hardness of the blade in a plane, and the softness of its shavings....In the movement of the branch from which a bird has just left, we read its flexibility and its elasticity, and this is how the branch of an apple tree and the branch of a birch are immediately distinguished.... Likewise, I hear the hardness and the unevenness of the cobblestones in the sound of a car, and we are right to speak of a "soft," "dull," or "dry" sound....If they are taken as incomparable qualities, then the "givens from the different senses" belong to so many separated worlds - each one, in its specific essence, being a manner of modulating the thing - then they nonetheless all communicate through their meaningful core.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012). Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge. p.238-9]
This description is true, but as far as it tries to describe the synesthetic nature of our ordinary perception. But I don't think its true, if it tries to explain the experiences of synesthesia reported by innate synesthetes. Their synesthesia does not seem to be mediated by any meaning but is the direct perception of the objects. The letter 5 looks green, the phone rings sky blue!
By opening up to the structure of the thing, the senses communicate among themselves. We see the rigidity and the fragility of the glass and, when it breaks with a crystal-clear sound, this sound is borne by the visible glass. We see the elasticity of steel, the ductility of molten steel, the hardness of the blade in a plane, and the softness of its shavings....In the movement of the branch from which a bird has just left, we read its flexibility and its elasticity, and this is how the branch of an apple tree and the branch of a birch are immediately distinguished.... Likewise, I hear the hardness and the unevenness of the cobblestones in the sound of a car, and we are right to speak of a "soft," "dull," or "dry" sound....If they are taken as incomparable qualities, then the "givens from the different senses" belong to so many separated worlds - each one, in its specific essence, being a manner of modulating the thing - then they nonetheless all communicate through their meaningful core.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012). Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge. p.238-9]
This description is true, but as far as it tries to describe the synesthetic nature of our ordinary perception. But I don't think its true, if it tries to explain the experiences of synesthesia reported by innate synesthetes. Their synesthesia does not seem to be mediated by any meaning but is the direct perception of the objects. The letter 5 looks green, the phone rings sky blue!
Friday, March 2, 2012
paper uploaded
I've uploaded my paper on the embodied knowledge at Academia.edu.
It's now available at the URL below.
http://u-tokai.academia.edu/ShogoTanaka/Papers
It's now available at the URL below.
http://u-tokai.academia.edu/ShogoTanaka/Papers
Wednesday, February 22, 2012
new translation
At the end of the last year, new English translation of Merlau-Ponty's "Phenomenology of Perception" (translated by Donald A. Landes) was published.
http://www.routledge.com/books/details/9780415558693/
PP is a must-read for those who really want to understant the embodied mind, the embodied cognition, the embodied knowledge. Merleau-ponty's work is more classical than that of Lakoff and Johnson or James Gibson.
PP is a must-read for those who really want to understant the embodied mind, the embodied cognition, the embodied knowledge. Merleau-ponty's work is more classical than that of Lakoff and Johnson or James Gibson.
Saturday, February 18, 2012
Merleau-Ponty on Synesthesia (1)
For Merleau-Ponty, synesthesia is a phenomenon which requires us to reconsider the paradigm of sensation and perception. He writes;
From the perspective of the objective world with its opaque qualities, or from the objective body with its isolated organs, the phenomenon of synesthesia is paradoxical. The attempt is thus made to explain it without touching the concept of sensation: it will be necessary, for example, to assume that stimulations ordinarily circumscribed within a region of the brain (the optical zone or auditory zone, for instance), become capable of intervening beyond these limits, and that in this way the specific quality is associated with a non-specific quality. Whether or not there are arguments in cerebral physiology for this explanation, it does not account for synesthetic experience, which thus becomes a new opportunity to put the concept of sensation and objective thought into question. For the subject does not tell us merely that he has a sound and a color at the same time: it is the sound itself that he sees, at the place where colors form. This formula is literally rendered meaningless if vision is defined by the visual quale, or sound by the sonorous quale. But it falls us to construct our definitions in such a way as to find a sense for this experience, since the vision of sounds or the hearing of colors exist as phenomena. And they are hardly exceptional phenomena. Synesthetic perception is the rule and, if we do not notice it, this is because scientific knowledge displaces experience and we have unlearned seeing, hearing, and sensing in general in order to deduce what we ought to see, hear, or sense from our bodily organization and from the world as it is conceived by the physicist.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge. p.237-8]
According to Merleau-Ponty, we have to learn to see, hear, and sense once again, by thinking of the meaning of synesthesia.
From the perspective of the objective world with its opaque qualities, or from the objective body with its isolated organs, the phenomenon of synesthesia is paradoxical. The attempt is thus made to explain it without touching the concept of sensation: it will be necessary, for example, to assume that stimulations ordinarily circumscribed within a region of the brain (the optical zone or auditory zone, for instance), become capable of intervening beyond these limits, and that in this way the specific quality is associated with a non-specific quality. Whether or not there are arguments in cerebral physiology for this explanation, it does not account for synesthetic experience, which thus becomes a new opportunity to put the concept of sensation and objective thought into question. For the subject does not tell us merely that he has a sound and a color at the same time: it is the sound itself that he sees, at the place where colors form. This formula is literally rendered meaningless if vision is defined by the visual quale, or sound by the sonorous quale. But it falls us to construct our definitions in such a way as to find a sense for this experience, since the vision of sounds or the hearing of colors exist as phenomena. And they are hardly exceptional phenomena. Synesthetic perception is the rule and, if we do not notice it, this is because scientific knowledge displaces experience and we have unlearned seeing, hearing, and sensing in general in order to deduce what we ought to see, hear, or sense from our bodily organization and from the world as it is conceived by the physicist.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1945/2012) Phenomenology of Perception. New York: Routledge. p.237-8]
According to Merleau-Ponty, we have to learn to see, hear, and sense once again, by thinking of the meaning of synesthesia.
Tuesday, January 24, 2012
unique synesthesia?
I met a student who seemed to have a special kind of synesthesia.
Synesthesia is a mixture of sensations in which stimulation of one sensory system arouses automatic and involuntary sensations in another. There are two popular forms: colored-hearing synesthesia and grapheme-color synesthesia. In the former, sounds are experienced with colors when they are heard (e.g., seeing sombody's voice green), while in the latter, letters or numbers are perceived as inherently colored (e.g., the number 5 is red). There are also other forms of synesthesia but what is common to all forms is that there occurs the secondary sensation that is not supposed to be aroused physiologically.
In my student's case, a sight of static objects (people, animals, plants and things in general) induces the visual sensation of geometrical figures. For example, one photograph that I presented as a stimulation aroused him the figures like below.
Most of the figures he 'sees' are abstract and geometrical. There seems to be no similarity between the shapes of objects and the figures he sees. His case is as strange as the case of 'the man who tasted shapes', reported by Richard Cytowic.
[Cytowic, R. (2003). The Man Who Tasted Shapes. MIT Press.]
Moreover, I've never heard of the synesthesia of this form. I am even not sure that this could be the synesthesia or not. If you have any information related to this phenomenon, please let me know. I hope to know if there is a case similar to his.
Synesthesia is a mixture of sensations in which stimulation of one sensory system arouses automatic and involuntary sensations in another. There are two popular forms: colored-hearing synesthesia and grapheme-color synesthesia. In the former, sounds are experienced with colors when they are heard (e.g., seeing sombody's voice green), while in the latter, letters or numbers are perceived as inherently colored (e.g., the number 5 is red). There are also other forms of synesthesia but what is common to all forms is that there occurs the secondary sensation that is not supposed to be aroused physiologically.
In my student's case, a sight of static objects (people, animals, plants and things in general) induces the visual sensation of geometrical figures. For example, one photograph that I presented as a stimulation aroused him the figures like below.
Most of the figures he 'sees' are abstract and geometrical. There seems to be no similarity between the shapes of objects and the figures he sees. His case is as strange as the case of 'the man who tasted shapes', reported by Richard Cytowic.
[Cytowic, R. (2003). The Man Who Tasted Shapes. MIT Press.]
Moreover, I've never heard of the synesthesia of this form. I am even not sure that this could be the synesthesia or not. If you have any information related to this phenomenon, please let me know. I hope to know if there is a case similar to his.
Sunday, January 15, 2012
Interpersonal Coordination: Matching and Synchrony
People in conversation highly mesh their bodily movements with each other. For instance, turning their gazes on the same object to share attention, showing similar postures or facial expressions when conversing in tune, synchronizing the speed of speaking or voice inflection, mimicking unconsciously the others' gestures. Conversation is not only the exchange of verbal information but also is the embodied interaction. Nonverbal behavior as embodied interaction probably underpin and facilitate the verbal communications.
Bernieri and Rosenthal conceptualize this kind of behavior meshing as 'interpersonal coordination'. Interpersonal coordination is "the degree to which the behaviors in an interaction are nonrandom, patterned, or synchronized in both timing and form". It can be categorized into two basic types: (1) behavior matching and (2) interactional synchrony.
[Bernieri, F. J. & Rosenthal, R. (1991). Interpersonal coordination: behavior matching and interactional synchrony. in Fundamentals of Nonerbal Behavior. Cambridge U. P., pp.401-432.]
1. Behavior matching
Congruence and similarity of physical behavior between interactants. Two people conversing may posture similarly, lean forward and back, or have their arms or legs crossed in the same way. They may appear to be mirrored reflections of each other.
2. Interactional synchrony
Timing aspect of interaction such as shared rhythm, simultaneous movement, and smooth meshing of interaction. Some interactions occur in a rapid fashion, others are slower or more fluid. Based on the shared rhythm, the interactants are entrained to a certain behavioral cycle and show the simultaneous movements in body orientation, postural change, gaze, vocal activity, facial expressions and so forth. This synchronization enables to mesh interactions of each other.
From the phenomenological side, interpersonal coordination in communication might be re-interpreted from the viewpoint of intercorporeality.
Bernieri and Rosenthal conceptualize this kind of behavior meshing as 'interpersonal coordination'. Interpersonal coordination is "the degree to which the behaviors in an interaction are nonrandom, patterned, or synchronized in both timing and form". It can be categorized into two basic types: (1) behavior matching and (2) interactional synchrony.
[Bernieri, F. J. & Rosenthal, R. (1991). Interpersonal coordination: behavior matching and interactional synchrony. in Fundamentals of Nonerbal Behavior. Cambridge U. P., pp.401-432.]
1. Behavior matching
Congruence and similarity of physical behavior between interactants. Two people conversing may posture similarly, lean forward and back, or have their arms or legs crossed in the same way. They may appear to be mirrored reflections of each other.
2. Interactional synchrony
Timing aspect of interaction such as shared rhythm, simultaneous movement, and smooth meshing of interaction. Some interactions occur in a rapid fashion, others are slower or more fluid. Based on the shared rhythm, the interactants are entrained to a certain behavioral cycle and show the simultaneous movements in body orientation, postural change, gaze, vocal activity, facial expressions and so forth. This synchronization enables to mesh interactions of each other.
From the phenomenological side, interpersonal coordination in communication might be re-interpreted from the viewpoint of intercorporeality.
Friday, December 30, 2011
Intertwining of vision and movement
Bodily movement plays the crucial role in our visual perception, as is shown in the Held and Hein's experiment. If there is no movement, there might be just a 'blur', a chaotic mixture of visual sensations.
Related to this point, I'd like to quote Merleau-Ponty's text.
Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the "I can". Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The Primacy of Perception. Northwestern Univ. Press. p.162]
It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand these transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body--not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement.
[Ibid.]
There is not a perception followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge. p.111]
The vision and the movement are deeply intertwined. As the self-actuated movement of the kitten developed the depth in vision, our movements of the eyes, the head, or the whole body transform the chaos of visual sensations into the adjusted visual perception with depth, forms, colors, and movements. It is not the mind's interpretation but bodily skills that give rise to changes in stimulation.
Vision is a kind of embodied skill. Maybe the painters are those who consciously practice this skill.
Related to this point, I'd like to quote Merleau-Ponty's text.
Everything I see is in principle within my reach, at least within reach of my sight, and is marked upon the map of the "I can". Each of the two maps is complete. The visible world and the world of my motor projects are each total parts of the same Being.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1964). The Primacy of Perception. Northwestern Univ. Press. p.162]
It is by lending his body to the world that the artist changes the world into paintings. To understand these transubstantiations we must go back to the working, actual body--not the body as a chunk of space or a bundle of functions but that body which is an intertwining of vision and movement.
[Ibid.]
There is not a perception followed by a movement, for both form a system which varies as a whole.
[Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge. p.111]
The vision and the movement are deeply intertwined. As the self-actuated movement of the kitten developed the depth in vision, our movements of the eyes, the head, or the whole body transform the chaos of visual sensations into the adjusted visual perception with depth, forms, colors, and movements. It is not the mind's interpretation but bodily skills that give rise to changes in stimulation.
Vision is a kind of embodied skill. Maybe the painters are those who consciously practice this skill.
Saturday, December 17, 2011
Classic experiment by Held and Hein
The well-known experiment on vision performed by Held and Hein: They harnessed a pair of kittens to a carousel (see the figure). One of the kittens was harnessed but stood on the ground and was able to rotate around by itself, while the other, being placed in the gondola, was only moved passively. As the one kitten walked, both moved in the circle.
[Held, R. and Hein A. (1963). Movement-produced stimulation in the development of visually guided behavior. Jouranal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology
56(5): 872-876.]
None of them have received light before the experiment, as they both were reared in darkness from birth. The point of this experiment is that both kittens were made to learn to see the world, receiving the same visual stimulation. The difference was that the one could move actively, the other was moved passively.
According to Held and Hein, only the self-moving kitten developed the normal visual perception. The other one, which was deprived of self-actuated movement, could not develop the depth perception. For example, it doesn't blink to an approaching object. In its visual field, I think, something looks 'bigger' when approaching, but never looks 'nearer'. The change of patterns in the visual field does not have the spatial meaning for the kitten.
The self-actuated movement is necessary in order to develop the normal visual perception with depth. Our movement in the world, the movement from here to there or there to here, gives the dimension of depth to mere visual sensations. Movement is the key to understanding the vision.
56(5): 872-876.]
None of them have received light before the experiment, as they both were reared in darkness from birth. The point of this experiment is that both kittens were made to learn to see the world, receiving the same visual stimulation. The difference was that the one could move actively, the other was moved passively.
According to Held and Hein, only the self-moving kitten developed the normal visual perception. The other one, which was deprived of self-actuated movement, could not develop the depth perception. For example, it doesn't blink to an approaching object. In its visual field, I think, something looks 'bigger' when approaching, but never looks 'nearer'. The change of patterns in the visual field does not have the spatial meaning for the kitten.
The self-actuated movement is necessary in order to develop the normal visual perception with depth. Our movement in the world, the movement from here to there or there to here, gives the dimension of depth to mere visual sensations. Movement is the key to understanding the vision.
Sunday, December 11, 2011
What is vision?
What is vision?
We tend to think, in general, that the vision (visual perception) is a passive process; visible light comes into our eyes and makes images on the retina. These are then transmitted via optic nerves and represented in the visual areas of the cerebral cortex. Once you open your eyes, a precise impression of the surrounding world is given to you. The visual system (eyes, optic nerves, visual areas) functions like a photograph or a mirror. It is believed to reflect the present world as it is.
But it does not seem the way things are. Oliver Sacks, a neurologist, describes the case of his patient Virgil, who restored the vision by surgery after 45 years of blindness:
Virgil told me later that in this first moment he had no idea what he was seeing. There was light, there was movement, there was color, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur. Then out of the blur came a voice that said, "Well?" Then, and only then, he said, did he finally realize that this chaos of light and shadow was a face --- and , indeed, the face of his surgeon.
[Sacks, O. (1995). An Anthropologist on Mars. p.114]
There is no problem with patient's eyes, retina, or optical nerves. He is not blind anymore after the surgery, but his visual world is totally chaotic. To put it accurately, he is seeing but he is not able to get the meaning of what he sees. There is light, movement and colors but they are all mixed up as 'a blur'. He is receiving the visible light perfectly but his visual world is perfectly meaningless.
How should we think about this case?
We tend to think, in general, that the vision (visual perception) is a passive process; visible light comes into our eyes and makes images on the retina. These are then transmitted via optic nerves and represented in the visual areas of the cerebral cortex. Once you open your eyes, a precise impression of the surrounding world is given to you. The visual system (eyes, optic nerves, visual areas) functions like a photograph or a mirror. It is believed to reflect the present world as it is.
But it does not seem the way things are. Oliver Sacks, a neurologist, describes the case of his patient Virgil, who restored the vision by surgery after 45 years of blindness:
Virgil told me later that in this first moment he had no idea what he was seeing. There was light, there was movement, there was color, all mixed up, all meaningless, a blur. Then out of the blur came a voice that said, "Well?" Then, and only then, he said, did he finally realize that this chaos of light and shadow was a face --- and , indeed, the face of his surgeon.
[Sacks, O. (1995). An Anthropologist on Mars. p.114]
There is no problem with patient's eyes, retina, or optical nerves. He is not blind anymore after the surgery, but his visual world is totally chaotic. To put it accurately, he is seeing but he is not able to get the meaning of what he sees. There is light, movement and colors but they are all mixed up as 'a blur'. He is receiving the visible light perfectly but his visual world is perfectly meaningless.
How should we think about this case?
Tuesday, November 1, 2011
Husserl's theory of the Other (4)
The other's body enters into my perceptual field. I perceive the world from 'here', where my body is, and 'there' I perceive the other's body paired to mine. Through pairing association, I know that it is a living body (Leib) like mine. I also know that my 'self' is always given with the mode 'here' and cannot be 'there', where the other Leib is. Hence the 'self' being 'there' is not myself but the other self. Husserl says:
# I do not apperceive the other ego simply as a duplicate of myself and accordingly as having my original sphere or one completely like mine....I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is.
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.117.]
# My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego is appresented, as other than mine. [p.119]
'Here' exists my own self, and 'There' exists the other self. The body being 'There' acts in the manner that I am acquainted with. It walks on the ground with her legs, looks around with her eyes, touches things with her hands. The other self firstly appears to me as something that controls her bodily movements in the same manner I do. Though I cannot directly reach the other self, her existence is verified through her behaviors.
Based on this fact, the other's mind is understood through empathy (Einfühlung). Mental processes such as anger or joy are also showed in the behaviors of the other.
# It is quite comprehensible that, as a further consequence, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "higher psychic sphere" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world --- for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. [p.120]
What Husserl claims in this passage apparently sounds similar to the simulation theory of mind. He is saying that we understand the other's mind through inner simulation based on our own experiences.
# I do not apperceive the other ego simply as a duplicate of myself and accordingly as having my original sphere or one completely like mine....I apperceive him as having spatial modes of appearance like those I should have if I should go over there and be where he is.
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.117.]
# My own ego however, the ego given in constant self-perception, is actual now with the content belonging to his Here. Therefore an ego is appresented, as other than mine. [p.119]
'Here' exists my own self, and 'There' exists the other self. The body being 'There' acts in the manner that I am acquainted with. It walks on the ground with her legs, looks around with her eyes, touches things with her hands. The other self firstly appears to me as something that controls her bodily movements in the same manner I do. Though I cannot directly reach the other self, her existence is verified through her behaviors.
Based on this fact, the other's mind is understood through empathy (Einfühlung). Mental processes such as anger or joy are also showed in the behaviors of the other.
# It is quite comprehensible that, as a further consequence, an "empathizing" of definite contents belonging to the "higher psychic sphere" arises. Such contents too are indicated somatically and in the conduct of the organism toward the outside world --- for example: as the outward conduct of someone who is angry or cheerful, which I easily understand from my own conduct under similar circumstances. [p.120]
What Husserl claims in this passage apparently sounds similar to the simulation theory of mind. He is saying that we understand the other's mind through inner simulation based on our own experiences.
Monday, October 31, 2011
additional comments on the notion of 'Pairing'
Husserl explains the notion of 'Pairing' as follows:
Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as "association", in contrast to passive synthesis of "identification". In a pairing association the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis --- essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed) ---, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they found phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair. If there are more than two such data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plurality, becomes constituted. On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a living mutual awakening and overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other. This overlaying can bring a total or a partial coincidence, which in any particular instance has its degree, the limiting case being that of complete "likeness". As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense --- that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of the other, so far as / moments of sense actualized in what is experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of "different".
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.113.]
My body and that of the other are not the same but they are enough similar to make 'a unity of similarity'. There is an 'intentional overreaching', which is 'a living mutual awakening and overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other'. Through this process, the other's body is recognized as a living body like mine.
The word "intentional overreaching" (original German is "intentionales Ubergreifen") was translated into French as "transgression intentionelle" and possibly had an influence on the Merleau-Pontian notion of "intercorporeality".
Pairing is a primal form of that passive synthesis which we designate as "association", in contrast to passive synthesis of "identification". In a pairing association the characteristic feature is that, in the most primitive case, two data are given intuitionally, and with prominence, in the unity of a consciousness and that, on this basis --- essentially, already in pure passivity (regardless therefore of whether they are noticed or unnoticed) ---, as data appearing with mutual distinctness, they found phenomenologically a unity of similarity and thus are always constituted precisely as a pair. If there are more than two such data, then a phenomenally unitary group, a plurality, becomes constituted. On more precise analysis we find essentially present here an intentional overreaching, coming about genetically (and by essential necessity) as soon as the data that undergo pairing have become prominent and simultaneously intended; we find, more particularly, a living mutual awakening and overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other. This overlaying can bring a total or a partial coincidence, which in any particular instance has its degree, the limiting case being that of complete "likeness". As the result of this overlaying, there takes place in the paired data a mutual transfer of sense --- that is to say: an apperception of each according to the sense of the other, so far as / moments of sense actualized in what is experienced do not annul this transfer, with the consciousness of "different".
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.113.]
My body and that of the other are not the same but they are enough similar to make 'a unity of similarity'. There is an 'intentional overreaching', which is 'a living mutual awakening and overlaying of each with the objective sense of the other'. Through this process, the other's body is recognized as a living body like mine.
The word "intentional overreaching" (original German is "intentionales Ubergreifen") was translated into French as "transgression intentionelle" and possibly had an influence on the Merleau-Pontian notion of "intercorporeality".
Sunday, October 23, 2011
Husserl's theory of the Other (3)
The body of the other is material and objective (Körper), but also living and animate (Leib) like mine. The other's body as Leib is not static. It appears to me as the body in behavior, which indicates indirectly the existence of other mental being.
The experienced animate organism of another continues to probe itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious "behavior". Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior.
The character of the existent "other" has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible....Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience --- an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated --- is "other".
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.114-5.]
According to Husserl, the mind of the other does not appear in itself. It is something to be apprehended indirectly behind the bodily behavior. Thus, Husserl would claim that the understanding of the other minds should be based on that of the other's behavior and accordant with it. Before simulations or theoretical inferences as is seen in Theory of Mind, it is needed to understand bodily movements, actions, and behaviors of the others. (Phenomenology itself does not tell us whether the theory-theory or simulation theory is true.)
Again, what is important here is understanding the other person as an embodied being. Though we are not able to access or grasp directly the other's mind, we should not posit it as an abstract entity separated from the body or the behavior. It is something realized in concrete behaviors in certain contexts.
The experienced animate organism of another continues to probe itself as actually an animate organism, solely in its changing but incessantly harmonious "behavior". Such harmonious behavior (as having a physical side that indicates something psychic appresentatively) must present itself fulfillingly in original experience, and do so throughout the continuous change in behavior from phase to phase. The organism becomes experienced as a pseudo-organism, precisely if there is something discordant about its behavior.
The character of the existent "other" has its basis in this kind of verifiable accessibility of what is not originally accessible....Whatever, by virtue thereof, is experienced in that founded manner which characterizes a primordially unfulfillable experience --- an experience that does not give something itself originally but that consistently verifies something indicated --- is "other".
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.114-5.]
According to Husserl, the mind of the other does not appear in itself. It is something to be apprehended indirectly behind the bodily behavior. Thus, Husserl would claim that the understanding of the other minds should be based on that of the other's behavior and accordant with it. Before simulations or theoretical inferences as is seen in Theory of Mind, it is needed to understand bodily movements, actions, and behaviors of the others. (Phenomenology itself does not tell us whether the theory-theory or simulation theory is true.)
Again, what is important here is understanding the other person as an embodied being. Though we are not able to access or grasp directly the other's mind, we should not posit it as an abstract entity separated from the body or the behavior. It is something realized in concrete behaviors in certain contexts.
Sunday, September 18, 2011
Husserl's theory of the Other (2)
In Husserl's theory, 'Pairing' (Paarung) is the second phase of constitution of the other.
The other's body appears in my perceptual field, originally as objective and material. But it is constituted as a living body through analogy, that is, it is apprehended as an animate organism since it is similar to my own living body. The other's body is recognized as 'the other person's living body', paired to my own living body. There is a process of 'Pairing' of my body and that of the other. Husserl says:
...pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism. Now in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body "similar" to mine --- that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine --- it seems clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism.
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.113]
In this passage, Husserl is simply claiming that I recognize the other's body as living body (Leib) because it is similar to mine. But how is the range of similarity asked here? For example, how about an animal's body?, a doll?, a robot? Do they have the body which can be paired to mine?
Anyway, what is important here is that we recognize the other person as an embodied being, before we recognize them as a mental being. The problem of other minds should be grounded on the embodiment.
The other's body appears in my perceptual field, originally as objective and material. But it is constituted as a living body through analogy, that is, it is apprehended as an animate organism since it is similar to my own living body. The other's body is recognized as 'the other person's living body', paired to my own living body. There is a process of 'Pairing' of my body and that of the other. Husserl says:
...pairing first comes about when the Other enters my field of perception. I, as the primordial psychophysical Ego, am always prominent in my primordial field of perception, regardless of whether I pay attention to myself and turn toward myself with some activity or other. In particular, my live body is always there and sensuously prominent; but, in addition to that and likewise with primordial originariness, it is equipped with the specific sense of an animate organism. Now in case there presents itself, as outstanding in my primordial sphere, a body "similar" to mine --- that is to say, a body with determinations such that it must enter into a phenomenal pairing with mine --- it seems clear without more ado that, with the transfer of sense, this body must forthwith appropriate from mine the sense: animate organism.
[Husserl, E (1950/1988). Cartesian Meditation. (trans.) D. Cairns. London: Kluwer Academic. p.113]
In this passage, Husserl is simply claiming that I recognize the other's body as living body (Leib) because it is similar to mine. But how is the range of similarity asked here? For example, how about an animal's body?, a doll?, a robot? Do they have the body which can be paired to mine?
Anyway, what is important here is that we recognize the other person as an embodied being, before we recognize them as a mental being. The problem of other minds should be grounded on the embodiment.
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