I will participate in the Embodiment Conference 2020 as a speaker. The conference is going to be held from October 14-20, on Zoom. You'll enjoy many lectures and sessions on embodiment from diverse perspectives. If you are interested in the conference, get your free access here;
https://theembodimentconference.org/
My British colleague Dr. Adrian Harris informed me that the crowdfunding campaign has started last week. It will help them finance the stable online platform where all the sessions will be arranged as well as the translation of conference sessions into several different languages.
https://www.teccrowdfund.org/
As a speaker I will join the panel organized by Adrian. I will inform you of the detail when it is fixed.
S
Thursday, June 18, 2020
Friday, November 1, 2019
my paper on depersonalization
The paper on depersonalization that I published last year has become downloadable. Here is the link.
What is it Like to Be Disconnected from the Body?: A Phenomenological Account of Disembodiment in Depersonalization/ Derealization Disorder
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2018/00000025/f0020005/art00010#
As you can see in the abstract, I examined the experience of disembodiment in depersonalization disorder especially in terms of the minima self. It maybe of interest for those who are working on phenomenology of embodiment, phenomenological psychopathology and the philosophy of psychiatry.
Enjoy the paper!
S
What is it Like to Be Disconnected from the Body?: A Phenomenological Account of Disembodiment in Depersonalization/ Derealization Disorder
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2018/00000025/f0020005/art00010#
As you can see in the abstract, I examined the experience of disembodiment in depersonalization disorder especially in terms of the minima self. It maybe of interest for those who are working on phenomenology of embodiment, phenomenological psychopathology and the philosophy of psychiatry.
Enjoy the paper!
S
Saturday, October 12, 2019
visiting Prague again
Thanks to the effort of my Czech colleagues, Martin Nitsche & Petr Urban, I am invited to give a talk in Prague again. I visited there for the first time three years ago to discuss in the workshop with philosopher Tom Sparrow.
This time I am going to give a talk on social cognition and intersubjectivity, especially on the concept of aida proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist, Bin Kimura. Here are my essays on aida in this blog.
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.com/search/label/Aida
For those who may be interested in my talk, here I share the abstract of my talk in Prague. My talk is scheduled for October 23rd.
SHOGO TANAKA & LASSE T. BERGMANN WORKSHOP
Title: On the normativity that emerges through embodied social interactions
Abstract:
The so-called interaction theory has brought rich insights into the debate on social cognition. Different from other major theories of mind, interaction theory describes the process of our social understanding focusing on the embodied interactions between the self and the other. In this presentation, I examine how the interaction theory can be further elaborated by drawing on the concept of aida, which was proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist Bin Kimura (1931-). Mainly describing an experience of music ensemble, Kimura explicates how the process of interpersonal interactions gain an autonomy as an emergent system. Beyond Kimura’s argument, I would like to show how this autonomy is experienced as a shared norm between the self and the other in social situations.
I look forward to feeling that special ambient of the city of Prague.
S
This time I am going to give a talk on social cognition and intersubjectivity, especially on the concept of aida proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist, Bin Kimura. Here are my essays on aida in this blog.
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.com/search/label/Aida
For those who may be interested in my talk, here I share the abstract of my talk in Prague. My talk is scheduled for October 23rd.
SHOGO TANAKA & LASSE T. BERGMANN WORKSHOP
Title: On the normativity that emerges through embodied social interactions
Abstract:
The so-called interaction theory has brought rich insights into the debate on social cognition. Different from other major theories of mind, interaction theory describes the process of our social understanding focusing on the embodied interactions between the self and the other. In this presentation, I examine how the interaction theory can be further elaborated by drawing on the concept of aida, which was proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist Bin Kimura (1931-). Mainly describing an experience of music ensemble, Kimura explicates how the process of interpersonal interactions gain an autonomy as an emergent system. Beyond Kimura’s argument, I would like to show how this autonomy is experienced as a shared norm between the self and the other in social situations.
S
Thursday, August 29, 2019
The Problem of Religious Experience
Dr. Olga Louchakova-Schwartz edited a new book, which I contributed a chapter to. It will be published in November.
Here's my chapter information.
[Chapter 2] Shogo Tanaka
Reconnecting the Self to the Divine: The Body’s Role in Religious Experience
It is the first time for me to consider religious experiences from a perspective of embodiment. Let me share the abstract with all of you. Enjoy it!
[Abstract]
I would like to explore spontaneous religious experiences, “spontaneous” meaning experiences that happen outside traditional religious beliefs or religious institutions and traditions but still have a religious nature. Such experiences include the feeling of unity with nature, experiences during peak performance in sports, or the sudden ecstatic sensation aroused by listening to a harmonious chorus, and so forth. Although they are not always recognized as “religious” for lack of a proper context, they are intense enough to awaken spiritual feelings. What is experienced as “something beyond the self” in these cases may be the foundational source of divinity underlying all sorts of religious activities. My goal is to further explore the experience of divinity from the perspective of the embodied self in terms of the sense of agency. James (1902) listed passivity as one of the four hallmarks of mystical experience: the person feels as if his or her actions are guided by the Other while maintaining a sense of agency. In my view, this state originates in the function of the body schema coordinating actions with the environment. In an unfamiliar situation, the body schema organizes new bodily actions beyond one’s intentions and expectations. Similarly, the body operates outside habit and as if following the Other’s will in spontaneous religious experiences.
Cheers,
S
Friday, May 3, 2019
to be published soon
A friend of mine, Luca Tateo invited me to contribute to the following book, which will be published soon.
Waldomiro J. Silva Filho & Luca Tateo (Eds.)
Thinking About Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology.
(Springer, Philosophical Studies Series)
https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783030182656
I wrote a chapter that focuses on the bodily origin of self-reflection. Though one tends to presuppose that reflection is something purely mental as Descartes did, actually it has bodily origin. Here's the title of my chapter and the abstract. I hope you enjoy it.
Chapter 9: Bodily origin of self-reflection and its socially extended aspects
Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University)
My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.
Regards,
S
Waldomiro J. Silva Filho & Luca Tateo (Eds.)
Thinking About Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology.
(Springer, Philosophical Studies Series)
I wrote a chapter that focuses on the bodily origin of self-reflection. Though one tends to presuppose that reflection is something purely mental as Descartes did, actually it has bodily origin. Here's the title of my chapter and the abstract. I hope you enjoy it.
Chapter 9: Bodily origin of self-reflection and its socially extended aspects
Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University)
My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.
Regards,
S
Monday, October 8, 2018
self in Japanese culture
A new book on cultural psychology was recently published by Routledge.
Gordana Jovanović, Lars Allolio-Näcke, & Carl Ratner (Eds.). (2018). The Challenges of Cultural Psychology: Historical Legacies and Future Responsibilities. New York, NY: Routledge.
https://www.routledge.com/The-Challenges-of-Cultural-Psychology-Historical-Legacies-and-Future-Responsibilities/Jovanovic-Allolio-Nacke-Ratner/p/book/9781138677227
The book covers diverse aspects of cultural psychology - its historical backgrounds, present and future. I also contributed a chapter on the self in Japanese culture, attempting to go beyond the cultural dichotomy such as "Western" and "Eastern." Here is the chapter title and the abstract.
Chapter 17: The Self in Japanese Culture from an Embodied Perspective (Shogo Tanaka)
[Abstract]
The main aim of this paper is to consider the self in Japanese culture from an embodied perspective. Since early 1990’s, the discourses on the embodied mind have brought a radical change in the sciences of mind, including the notion of the self. In the following argument, first, I briefly describe the basic aspects of the embodied self, the notion of which was derived from the embodied mind paradigm. Then, I examine the discourse on the self in cross-cultural psychology that focuses on the differences in the self between the West and East, including Japanese culture. In the extant literature, it is widely acknowledged that the self in Eastern (or more widely, non-Western) cultures has the characteristics of being “interdependent” and “collective” in comparison with that in Western cultures. In addition to this, the self in Japanese culture has been described as “relationship dependent.” Finally, I give an account of the same characteristics from an embodied perspective in order to find a path to an understanding of the self beyond cultural dichotomies, such as “Western” and “Eastern.” If the self is inevitably embodied, such a self could be constituted as either “individual” or “collective,” “independent” or “interdependent,” regardless of the cultural background.
If you are interested in reading it, please let me know. My chapter may be of interest for those who hope to understand the connection between cultural issues and the embodied self.
Regards,
S
Gordana Jovanović, Lars Allolio-Näcke, & Carl Ratner (Eds.). (2018). The Challenges of Cultural Psychology: Historical Legacies and Future Responsibilities. New York, NY: Routledge.
The book covers diverse aspects of cultural psychology - its historical backgrounds, present and future. I also contributed a chapter on the self in Japanese culture, attempting to go beyond the cultural dichotomy such as "Western" and "Eastern." Here is the chapter title and the abstract.
Chapter 17: The Self in Japanese Culture from an Embodied Perspective (Shogo Tanaka)
[Abstract]
The main aim of this paper is to consider the self in Japanese culture from an embodied perspective. Since early 1990’s, the discourses on the embodied mind have brought a radical change in the sciences of mind, including the notion of the self. In the following argument, first, I briefly describe the basic aspects of the embodied self, the notion of which was derived from the embodied mind paradigm. Then, I examine the discourse on the self in cross-cultural psychology that focuses on the differences in the self between the West and East, including Japanese culture. In the extant literature, it is widely acknowledged that the self in Eastern (or more widely, non-Western) cultures has the characteristics of being “interdependent” and “collective” in comparison with that in Western cultures. In addition to this, the self in Japanese culture has been described as “relationship dependent.” Finally, I give an account of the same characteristics from an embodied perspective in order to find a path to an understanding of the self beyond cultural dichotomies, such as “Western” and “Eastern.” If the self is inevitably embodied, such a self could be constituted as either “individual” or “collective,” “independent” or “interdependent,” regardless of the cultural background.
If you are interested in reading it, please let me know. My chapter may be of interest for those who hope to understand the connection between cultural issues and the embodied self.
Regards,
S
Sunday, August 12, 2018
Bodily Basis of the Diverse Modes of the Self
My new paper on embodiment is published in Human Arenas, a new journal from Springer. You can follow the link and download the PDF for free. Enjoy it!
Here is the abstract;
Bodily experiences encompass and underpin all types of experiences of the mind, ranging from pre-reflective to self-reflective, from subjective to intersubjective, and from collectivistic to individualistic. Moreover, the self is shaped into diverse modes of being as a result of different focuses on bodily experiences. This paper describes the experiences of one’s body-as-subject, one’s body-as-object for oneself, and one’s body-as-object for others, as they relate with the self. After theoretical considerations, we take up the experience of wearing clothes as a concrete example. The author’s personal experiences adequately show that clothes portray the complexity and dynamism of the self in its relation to the body.
Although it still remains at the initial stage, I attempted to describe my personal experience of clothing in the last section. Please let me know your ideas if you are interested in developing the "phenomenology of clothing" together. It would be fun!
S
Here is the abstract;
Bodily experiences encompass and underpin all types of experiences of the mind, ranging from pre-reflective to self-reflective, from subjective to intersubjective, and from collectivistic to individualistic. Moreover, the self is shaped into diverse modes of being as a result of different focuses on bodily experiences. This paper describes the experiences of one’s body-as-subject, one’s body-as-object for oneself, and one’s body-as-object for others, as they relate with the self. After theoretical considerations, we take up the experience of wearing clothes as a concrete example. The author’s personal experiences adequately show that clothes portray the complexity and dynamism of the self in its relation to the body.
Although it still remains at the initial stage, I attempted to describe my personal experience of clothing in the last section. Please let me know your ideas if you are interested in developing the "phenomenology of clothing" together. It would be fun!
S
Sunday, June 10, 2018
New paper on Depersonalization
Recently my new paper on depersonalization was published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies.
As you can see on the title, I tackled the subjective feeling of disembodiment, which is one of the major symptoms in depersonalization disorder. Here is the abstract:
So long as I maintain the ordinary modes of experience such as walking or eating, the body appears to me as something inseparable from myself. Through and with the body I act in the world, and through and from the body I perceive the world. However, this is not the case in the pathological condition known as depersonalization/ derealization disorder (DD). People with DD frequently claim that their self is disconnected from the body and their bodily actions feel like those of a robot. This symptom raises an important question about the paradigm of the embodied self, which is whether the union of body and self is contingent or not. In this paper, I describe the split between the self and body experienced in DD, then compare it with experiences of the full-body illusion, in which the self is perceived to be located out of the physical body. Through this comparison, it is made clear that the self in DD is not totally disembodied even though the basic sense of self has gone through a qualitative change.
In the paper, I claimed that the self in depersonalization is not totally disembodied in terms of motor agency. I hope this finding would be a hint for the future development of effective therapy...
S
Saturday, May 5, 2018
lectures in Taiwan
I am in Taiwan to give lectures on phenomenological psychology. Dr. Wei-Lun Lee of National Dong Hwa University is the main collaborator this time. He and I are trying to develop a circle of researchers and students who are interested in phenomenology-based research in clinical psychology and other related fields such as psychiatry, education, nursing, and so on.
Yesterday I gave a lecture at the department of psychology in National Taiwan University. My talk was titled "Reconsidering the symptoms of Taijin Kyofusho from an embodied perspective."
http://www.psy.ntu.edu.tw/index.php/eng/events/1805-1070503e
And today I gave another lecture at the department of counselling and clinical psychology in National Dong Hwa University. Today’s talk was titled “The lived body and motor learning: Refining the Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body schema.”
With the aid of the local organizers including Dr. Yaw-Sheng Lin, Dr. Shyh-Heng Wong and Dr. Rong-Bang Peng, I could have a very vibrant discussion with all the students. Many thanks to all of you!
S
Yesterday I gave a lecture at the department of psychology in National Taiwan University. My talk was titled "Reconsidering the symptoms of Taijin Kyofusho from an embodied perspective."
http://www.psy.ntu.edu.tw/index.php/eng/events/1805-1070503e
And today I gave another lecture at the department of counselling and clinical psychology in National Dong Hwa University. Today’s talk was titled “The lived body and motor learning: Refining the Merleau-Ponty’s notion of body schema.”
With the aid of the local organizers including Dr. Yaw-Sheng Lin, Dr. Shyh-Heng Wong and Dr. Rong-Bang Peng, I could have a very vibrant discussion with all the students. Many thanks to all of you!
S
Friday, March 30, 2018
many thanks.
Thanks to all the participants, two-day symposium on Body Schema and Body Image went very well. Though I closed the independent page, but here I leave the same information as a log. My special thanks go to Yochai Ataria, Shaun Gallagher, Shu Imaizumi, Shintaro Omagari, and Ziyan Huang, who made possible to organize this event successfully.
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Symposium: Body schema and body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Online Registration: https://goo.gl/forms/650de8h9h0A7LgPe2
The distinction between body image and body schema is a long-standing as well as a modern issue in diverse research fields related to embodiment. Looking back at its history, the concept of body schema was first introduced to neurology in the early 20th century (e.g., Head & Holmes, 1911). Diverse disturbances in sensory-motor activities resulting from neural and brain lesions were successfully described by using this concept. Phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia and other symptoms have been explicated in terms of body schema. It also developed as a psychological concept related to wider problems such as schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder among others (e.g., Schilder, 1935). Both ideas are rich in their potential to explicate diverse phenomena in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, sports science and other related fields.
However, several books and papers (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; de Preester & Knockaert, 2005; de Vignemont, 2010) have indicated that the lack of theoretical distinction between body schema and body image has resulted in conceptual confusion in research. Ian Waterman’s unique story of deafferentation was one of the cases that gave us an opportunity to consider this issue along with a concrete phenomenon. Although body schema and body image have become one of the most frequently used concepts in interdisciplinary research on embodiment, there still remains many questions including;
Whatever the answers might be, we believe that it is important to reconsider the distinction between body schema and body image within the context of the concrete phenomena of embodiment. In this symposium, we welcome papers that address questions relevant to the above-mentioned questions and will try to explicate a concrete phenomenon based on the notion of body schema or body image, as well as attempt to newly expand concepts regarding body representation including body schema and body image. Moreover, after the symposium, well-prepared presentations will be published as book chapters edited by the organizers of the conference.
[Keynote Address]
Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis):
Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence at the University of Memphis. His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, especially topics related to embodiment, self, agency and intersubjectivity, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of time. His recent publications include Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. (Oxford University Press, 2017) and many other articles.
[Program - March 24th (Saturday)]
Gathering 09:30-10:00
Introduction 10:00-10:15
Session 1
(10:15-11:00) Andreas Kalckert (University of Reading Malaysia) "Das Körpergefühl" (The body feeling): The experience of the body in German neurology of the early 20th century"
(11:00-11:45) Katsunori Miyahara (Harvard University/The University of Tokyo) "Pain asymbolia and the sense of body-identification"
Coffee
Session 2
(12:00-12:45) Shu Imaizumi (The University of Tokyo) "Integration of prosthetic and phantom limbs into body schema"
(12:45-13:30) Vinaya E H and Megha Sanyal (Indian Institute of Technology) "Problems in body representation: Understanding Anorexia Nervosa through the forward model"
Lunch
Lecture 1
(14:30-15:45) Yochai Ataria (Tel-Hei College/The Open University) "Body disownership in complex post-traumatic stress disorder"
Coffee
Session 3
(16:00-16:45) Michiko Miyazaki (Otsuma Women's University) "The development of body representation in young children"
(16:45-17:30) Tomohisa Asai (Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International - ATR) "Beyond body-schema/-image dichotomy: The functional hierarchy for the unified self-representation"
Dinner 19:00-21:00
[Program - March 25th (Sunday)]
Keynote Address (Online Lecture)
(10:00-11:15) Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis) "Reimagining the body image"
Coffee
Lecture 2
(11:30-12:45) Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University) "Body schema and body image in motor learning: Refining Merleau-Pontian notion of body schema"
Lunch
Session 4
(13:45-14:30) Kentaro Hiromitsu (Chuo University) "The triadic taxonomy of the body representation: Evidence from the brain-damaged patients with bodily disorders and the experimental study of bodily illusions"
(14:30-15:15) Noriaki Kanayama (Hiroshima University) "Body in retinotopy and somatotopy"
(15:15-16:00) Thomas Tajo and Daniel Kish (Visioneers) "FlashSonar or Echolocation education: Expanding the function of hearing and changing the meaning of blindness"
Coffee
Session 5
(16:15-17:00) Wei-Lun Lee (National Dong Hwa University) "The bodily experience of chi: A phenomenological investigation"
(17:00-17:45) Jen Learn (Western Michigan University) "The queer nature of embodiment (and the embodied nature of the queer): Psychology, sex, and the bodily ego"
Summary 17:45-18:00
[Organizers]
Yochai Ataria, Ph. D. (yochai.ataria[a]gmail.com)
Shogo Tanaka, Ph. D. (shg.tanaka[a]gmail.com)
[Venue]
The University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus,
Building 2, Room 308 (3rd floor)
Access: http://www.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eng_site/info/about/visitors/maps-directions/
Map: http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020146.pdf
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
International Symposium: Body schema and body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Online Registration: https://goo.gl/forms/650de8h9h0A7LgPe2
The distinction between body image and body schema is a long-standing as well as a modern issue in diverse research fields related to embodiment. Looking back at its history, the concept of body schema was first introduced to neurology in the early 20th century (e.g., Head & Holmes, 1911). Diverse disturbances in sensory-motor activities resulting from neural and brain lesions were successfully described by using this concept. Phantom limbs, asomatognosia, apraxia and other symptoms have been explicated in terms of body schema. It also developed as a psychological concept related to wider problems such as schizophrenia, anorexia, depersonalization, and body dysmorphic disorder among others (e.g., Schilder, 1935). Both ideas are rich in their potential to explicate diverse phenomena in neuroscience, psychology, psychiatry, cognitive science, sports science and other related fields.
However, several books and papers (e.g., Gallagher, 2005; de Preester & Knockaert, 2005; de Vignemont, 2010) have indicated that the lack of theoretical distinction between body schema and body image has resulted in conceptual confusion in research. Ian Waterman’s unique story of deafferentation was one of the cases that gave us an opportunity to consider this issue along with a concrete phenomenon. Although body schema and body image have become one of the most frequently used concepts in interdisciplinary research on embodiment, there still remains many questions including;
- Is this distinction based on differences between conscious access (body image) and unconscious organization (body schema)?
- Is the distinction based on differences between perception (body image) and movement (body schema)?
- Are there other factors that facilitate clear distinctions?
- Is the distinction theoretical rather than empirical? Or vice versa?
- If the distinction is theoretical, how would it be related to the concrete phenomenon of embodiment? And if it is empirical, how far can it be elaborated theoretically?
Whatever the answers might be, we believe that it is important to reconsider the distinction between body schema and body image within the context of the concrete phenomena of embodiment. In this symposium, we welcome papers that address questions relevant to the above-mentioned questions and will try to explicate a concrete phenomenon based on the notion of body schema or body image, as well as attempt to newly expand concepts regarding body representation including body schema and body image. Moreover, after the symposium, well-prepared presentations will be published as book chapters edited by the organizers of the conference.
[Keynote Address]
Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis):
Lillian and Morrie Moss Professor of Excellence at the University of Memphis. His areas of research include phenomenology and the cognitive sciences, especially topics related to embodiment, self, agency and intersubjectivity, hermeneutics, and the philosophy of time. His recent publications include Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind. (Oxford University Press, 2017) and many other articles.
[Program - March 24th (Saturday)]
Gathering 09:30-10:00
Introduction 10:00-10:15
Session 1
(10:15-11:00) Andreas Kalckert (University of Reading Malaysia) "Das Körpergefühl" (The body feeling): The experience of the body in German neurology of the early 20th century"
(11:00-11:45) Katsunori Miyahara (Harvard University/The University of Tokyo) "Pain asymbolia and the sense of body-identification"
Coffee
Session 2
(12:00-12:45) Shu Imaizumi (The University of Tokyo) "Integration of prosthetic and phantom limbs into body schema"
(12:45-13:30) Vinaya E H and Megha Sanyal (Indian Institute of Technology) "Problems in body representation: Understanding Anorexia Nervosa through the forward model"
Lunch
Lecture 1
(14:30-15:45) Yochai Ataria (Tel-Hei College/The Open University) "Body disownership in complex post-traumatic stress disorder"
Coffee
Session 3
(16:00-16:45) Michiko Miyazaki (Otsuma Women's University) "The development of body representation in young children"
(16:45-17:30) Tomohisa Asai (Advanced Telecommunications Research Institute International - ATR) "Beyond body-schema/-image dichotomy: The functional hierarchy for the unified self-representation"
Dinner 19:00-21:00
[Program - March 25th (Sunday)]
Keynote Address (Online Lecture)
(10:00-11:15) Shaun Gallagher (University of Memphis) "Reimagining the body image"
Coffee
Lecture 2
(11:30-12:45) Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University) "Body schema and body image in motor learning: Refining Merleau-Pontian notion of body schema"
Lunch
Session 4
(13:45-14:30) Kentaro Hiromitsu (Chuo University) "The triadic taxonomy of the body representation: Evidence from the brain-damaged patients with bodily disorders and the experimental study of bodily illusions"
(14:30-15:15) Noriaki Kanayama (Hiroshima University) "Body in retinotopy and somatotopy"
(15:15-16:00) Thomas Tajo and Daniel Kish (Visioneers) "FlashSonar or Echolocation education: Expanding the function of hearing and changing the meaning of blindness"
Coffee
Session 5
(16:15-17:00) Wei-Lun Lee (National Dong Hwa University) "The bodily experience of chi: A phenomenological investigation"
(17:00-17:45) Jen Learn (Western Michigan University) "The queer nature of embodiment (and the embodied nature of the queer): Psychology, sex, and the bodily ego"
Summary 17:45-18:00
[Organizers]
Yochai Ataria, Ph. D. (yochai.ataria[a]gmail.com)
Shogo Tanaka, Ph. D. (shg.tanaka[a]gmail.com)
[Venue]
The University of Tokyo, Komaba I Campus,
Building 2, Room 308 (3rd floor)
Access: http://www.c.u-tokyo.ac.jp/eng_site/info/about/visitors/maps-directions/
Map: http://www.u-tokyo.ac.jp/content/400020146.pdf
Sunday, February 18, 2018
symposium page updated
I added the program of the symposium in March on the independent page.
International Symposium: Body schema and Body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/p/symposium.html
Thanks to all of you, we received a large number of abstracts for the symposium. You can find many interesting topics on the program, covering from neuroscience to cultural studies. Please participate in our two-day symposium in Tokyo.
See you soon!
International Symposium: Body schema and Body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/p/symposium.html
Thanks to all of you, we received a large number of abstracts for the symposium. You can find many interesting topics on the program, covering from neuroscience to cultural studies. Please participate in our two-day symposium in Tokyo.
See you soon!
Saturday, December 30, 2017
symposium page is open
I newly added an independent page on the international symposium to be held in Tokyo next March.
International Symposium: Body schema and Body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/p/symposium.html
If you are a researcher working on the related topics concerning body schema and/or body image, you are welcome to present your idea in the symposium. You can submit your abstract by January 24 either to Dr. Yochai Ataria or me by e-mail.
If you are a lay person who are interested in broader topics in embodiment, you are welcome to join us as a participant. This event is free of charge (except the dinner).
Online Registration
https://goo.gl/forms/650de8h9h0A7LgPe2
See you soon in Tokyo!
International Symposium: Body schema and Body image
March 24-25, 2018
The University of Tokyo (Komaba Campus), Japan
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.jp/p/symposium.html
If you are a researcher working on the related topics concerning body schema and/or body image, you are welcome to present your idea in the symposium. You can submit your abstract by January 24 either to Dr. Yochai Ataria or me by e-mail.
If you are a lay person who are interested in broader topics in embodiment, you are welcome to join us as a participant. This event is free of charge (except the dinner).
Online Registration
https://goo.gl/forms/650de8h9h0A7LgPe2
See you soon in Tokyo!
Saturday, December 2, 2017
a brief guide: "Ecology of the Brain"
Thomas Fuchs (forthcoming)
Ecology of the Brain: The phenomenology and biology of the embodied mind.
Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
"Ecology of the brain" is a book that tries to understand the proper role of the brain as a part of the living organism. In the current neuroscience (or rather, neurophilosophy) there is a wide-spread tendency to overemphasize the importance of the brain, as if it were creating our authorship of actions, the sense of self, and the consciousness itself.
Although it is obvious that the brain plays an important role in our cognitive lives, the brain itself is originally an organ that is embedded in the living body. And the body maintains itself as a living being by interacting with its surrounding environment.
If so, as the author himself writes, the brain is to be understood as "an organ of relation and interaction: with the body itself, with the immediate environment of the organism, and with the social and cultural environment of the lifeworld." And this idea would re-explicate the relationship between "mind" and "brain." Both mind and brain would be regarded as dual aspects of the living being.
Focusing on the body itself, we notice that it originally has two properties. The body appears as a material thing on the one hand, but it appears as a living subject of experience on the other. In phenomenology, the former aspect of the body is referred to as "Körper (the material body)", and the latter as "Leib (the lived body)." In this regard, the primary locus of self-consciousness is not the brain, but the body. In terms of mind-body problem, the brain is a part of "Körper" and the mind corresponds to the functions of "Leib."
As I informed you already in this blog, I am going to organize an online reading group. In it, let us consider how the author opens up a new view on consiousness and cognition on the basis of his ecological view of the brain. Please send me an e-mail (shg.tanaka<a>gmail.com) if you are interested in joining the group.
Friday, November 24, 2017
a very important book
... will be published soon by Oxford University Press.
Is there anyone who wants to read this book and share discussions? I am planning on organizing an online reading group (using Skype or Google Hangout). Please send me an e-mail if you are interested in joining us. As the book will be published in December 14th, I would like to start the activity in the end of December. Send me an e-mail to shg.tanaka<a>gmail.com for further questions.
Saturday, July 15, 2017
Symposium in ISTP 2017
Next month, the 17th Biennial Conference of International Society for Theoretical Psychology will be held in Tokyo.
[The 17th Biennial Conference of The ISTP at Rikkyo University, Tokyo, August 21 - August 25, 2017]
Here I share the information on our symposium scheduled on August 24th, from 11:00 to 12:30.
[Symposium]
Quest for new methods in phenomenological psychology
[Aim and Scope]
Phenomenological psychology is understood as a psychological project for investigating the structure and the meanings of lived experiences of people as they are given in the Lifeworld. As its general methods, the researcher interviews participants who have a particular experience, and then, analyzes participants’ descriptions to explicate the structure of the experience (descriptive method), or interprets the narrated stories to understand the meanings of the experience (interpretative method). Diverse topics have been investigated so far including the experiences of empathy, mourning, parenting, and physical diseases, among others. Though the details of research methods are different in diverse schools, priority is given to interview data narrated by participants, because the research is oriented to understanding lived experiences from the first-person perspective. This symposium addresses theoretical problems related to this primary topic and investigates new research methods in phenomenological psychology. There are certain related questions: How can the researcher understand the experience of a participant that has a different perspective? What can the researcher do when a participant does not seem to communicate the experience as it is given, because of the influence of particular beliefs and preconceptions? Is it allowed to posit that the interview is a collaborative experience of both the participant and the researcher because they create the data together through dialogue? Is it possible to design studies in phenomenological psychology that do not use interviews? The panelists will refer to these fundamental questions, by showing examples from their own research methods.
[Abstract 1] Darren Langdridge (The Open University, UK)
“Making space for suspicion: introducing a critical narrative methodology”
Phenomenological research methods have developed with a strong theoretical and practical opposition to psychoanalytically informed methodologies. One consequence of this opposition is that practitioners of these methods have sought to distance themselves from the hermeneutic of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970). They have instead concentrated on a hermeneutic of meaning-recollection or empathy (Ricoeur, 1970), which prioritises the expressed experience of participants. This shift in focus has provided a valuable corrective to the worst excesses of the deterministic hermeneutic of suspicion, which subjugates the participant's experience to that of the researcher. However, one of the major problems in analysing a person's experience is that it is not just expressed in language but also shaped by it. Because of this, we cannot always take what people say at face value, as a direct and faithful account of their experience. I intend to explore the possibility of applying ideas from Paul Ricoeur to the research process and in the process demonstrate how it is possible to account for power and politics within a phenomenological research methodology. To this end, I introduce a relatively new method, Critical Narrative Analysis, which accounts for the effects of language and the lived experience of participants. I argue that this theoretical perspective, which employs imaginative rather than depth hermeneutics, grounded in critical social theory, provides a way forward for phenomenological theory and practice which recognises the need for political critique without imposing deterministic frameworks of meaning onto the data and thus stays true to the phenomenological project.
[Abstract 2] Tsuneo Watanabe (Toho University, Japan)
“Phenomenological elucidation of dreams based on Intentionalities: A new horizon for Husserlian analysis of dreams”
This is a study of dream analysis based on Husserlian intentionalities. This type of analysis, or phenomenological elucidation, is an attempt not only to describe experiences but also to answer the question “why….?” For example, “why is it possible to become someone else in dreams?” Phenomenological elucidation is, nevertheless, neither a scientific explanation nor a psychoanalytical interpretation, but a process of identifying phenomenological structures behind individual examples. In this dream analysis, by comparing each “dream text” with its corresponding “real text”, fundamental phenomenological structural differences were extracted as different kinds of intentionality, which result in answers to the question “why….?” For example, the real text, “I imagine “I am Harry Potter”” is transformed into a dream text “I am Harry Potter”, because “re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung)” in the real world is transformed into “presentation (Gegenwärtigung)” in the dream world. The reason why “re-presentations” are transformed into “presentations” will be further elucidated based on Husserlian theories of imagination and intersubjectivity. I have used examples from my own “dream-diary” website. Using the investigators’ own reports on their personal websites is expected to facilitated anyone with the ability and motivation to describe their own experiences, as well as “professionals”, to participate in phenomenological investigations, not only as participants but also as investigators. The phenomenological difference between exclusively using descriptions of investigators’ own experiences and, as is used in many studies, relying on others’ experiences will be discussed in conclusion.
[Abstract 3] Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University, Japan)
“Psychological experiments as a sort of imaginative variation”
In this symposium, I would like to consider possible connections between phenomenology and psychological experiments. Major approaches in phenomenological psychology emphasize the importance of interviews in research practice because data collected through interviews are the primary descriptions of lived experiences. However, phenomenological research does not constitute only of descriptions but of exploring the invariable structure of lived experiences. Husserl himself emphasized the importance of using the method of imaginative variation in this step. In my opinion, diverse results of psychological experiments can be utilized to expand the possibilities of imaginative variation. For example, Merleau-Ponty described how the lived body extends its sensitivity by incorporating tools into it. According to his view, using tools through dynamic interactions with the environment, in other words, incorporating tools through bodily movements, is the essence of this phenomenon. However, experiments on the rubber hand illusion show that simultaneous input of visual and tactile stimuli is the primary condition for inducing extensions of sensitivity and that movement is unnecessary. Generally speaking, psychological experiments have the advantage of controlling diverse conditions inherent in experiences as independent variables in experimental settings. They do not serve to describe lived experiences themselves but serve to elucidate conditions of certain experiences. In this sense, psychological experiments can inform theoretical investigations in phenomenology, especially in the process of identifying structures of lived experiences through imaginative variation.
[The 17th Biennial Conference of The ISTP at Rikkyo University, Tokyo, August 21 - August 25, 2017]
Here I share the information on our symposium scheduled on August 24th, from 11:00 to 12:30.
[Symposium]
Quest for new methods in phenomenological psychology
[Speakers]
- Darren Langdridge (The Open University, United Kingdom)
- Tsuneo Watanabe (Toho University, Japan)
- Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University, Japan)
[Discussant]
- Masayoshi Morioka (Ritsumeikan University, Japan)
- Darren Langdridge (The Open University, United Kingdom)
- Tsuneo Watanabe (Toho University, Japan)
- Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University, Japan)
[Discussant]
- Masayoshi Morioka (Ritsumeikan University, Japan)
Phenomenological psychology is understood as a psychological project for investigating the structure and the meanings of lived experiences of people as they are given in the Lifeworld. As its general methods, the researcher interviews participants who have a particular experience, and then, analyzes participants’ descriptions to explicate the structure of the experience (descriptive method), or interprets the narrated stories to understand the meanings of the experience (interpretative method). Diverse topics have been investigated so far including the experiences of empathy, mourning, parenting, and physical diseases, among others. Though the details of research methods are different in diverse schools, priority is given to interview data narrated by participants, because the research is oriented to understanding lived experiences from the first-person perspective. This symposium addresses theoretical problems related to this primary topic and investigates new research methods in phenomenological psychology. There are certain related questions: How can the researcher understand the experience of a participant that has a different perspective? What can the researcher do when a participant does not seem to communicate the experience as it is given, because of the influence of particular beliefs and preconceptions? Is it allowed to posit that the interview is a collaborative experience of both the participant and the researcher because they create the data together through dialogue? Is it possible to design studies in phenomenological psychology that do not use interviews? The panelists will refer to these fundamental questions, by showing examples from their own research methods.
[Abstract 1] Darren Langdridge (The Open University, UK)
“Making space for suspicion: introducing a critical narrative methodology”
Phenomenological research methods have developed with a strong theoretical and practical opposition to psychoanalytically informed methodologies. One consequence of this opposition is that practitioners of these methods have sought to distance themselves from the hermeneutic of suspicion (Ricoeur, 1970). They have instead concentrated on a hermeneutic of meaning-recollection or empathy (Ricoeur, 1970), which prioritises the expressed experience of participants. This shift in focus has provided a valuable corrective to the worst excesses of the deterministic hermeneutic of suspicion, which subjugates the participant's experience to that of the researcher. However, one of the major problems in analysing a person's experience is that it is not just expressed in language but also shaped by it. Because of this, we cannot always take what people say at face value, as a direct and faithful account of their experience. I intend to explore the possibility of applying ideas from Paul Ricoeur to the research process and in the process demonstrate how it is possible to account for power and politics within a phenomenological research methodology. To this end, I introduce a relatively new method, Critical Narrative Analysis, which accounts for the effects of language and the lived experience of participants. I argue that this theoretical perspective, which employs imaginative rather than depth hermeneutics, grounded in critical social theory, provides a way forward for phenomenological theory and practice which recognises the need for political critique without imposing deterministic frameworks of meaning onto the data and thus stays true to the phenomenological project.
[Abstract 2] Tsuneo Watanabe (Toho University, Japan)
“Phenomenological elucidation of dreams based on Intentionalities: A new horizon for Husserlian analysis of dreams”
This is a study of dream analysis based on Husserlian intentionalities. This type of analysis, or phenomenological elucidation, is an attempt not only to describe experiences but also to answer the question “why….?” For example, “why is it possible to become someone else in dreams?” Phenomenological elucidation is, nevertheless, neither a scientific explanation nor a psychoanalytical interpretation, but a process of identifying phenomenological structures behind individual examples. In this dream analysis, by comparing each “dream text” with its corresponding “real text”, fundamental phenomenological structural differences were extracted as different kinds of intentionality, which result in answers to the question “why….?” For example, the real text, “I imagine “I am Harry Potter”” is transformed into a dream text “I am Harry Potter”, because “re-presentation (Vergegenwärtigung)” in the real world is transformed into “presentation (Gegenwärtigung)” in the dream world. The reason why “re-presentations” are transformed into “presentations” will be further elucidated based on Husserlian theories of imagination and intersubjectivity. I have used examples from my own “dream-diary” website. Using the investigators’ own reports on their personal websites is expected to facilitated anyone with the ability and motivation to describe their own experiences, as well as “professionals”, to participate in phenomenological investigations, not only as participants but also as investigators. The phenomenological difference between exclusively using descriptions of investigators’ own experiences and, as is used in many studies, relying on others’ experiences will be discussed in conclusion.
[Abstract 3] Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University, Japan)
“Psychological experiments as a sort of imaginative variation”
In this symposium, I would like to consider possible connections between phenomenology and psychological experiments. Major approaches in phenomenological psychology emphasize the importance of interviews in research practice because data collected through interviews are the primary descriptions of lived experiences. However, phenomenological research does not constitute only of descriptions but of exploring the invariable structure of lived experiences. Husserl himself emphasized the importance of using the method of imaginative variation in this step. In my opinion, diverse results of psychological experiments can be utilized to expand the possibilities of imaginative variation. For example, Merleau-Ponty described how the lived body extends its sensitivity by incorporating tools into it. According to his view, using tools through dynamic interactions with the environment, in other words, incorporating tools through bodily movements, is the essence of this phenomenon. However, experiments on the rubber hand illusion show that simultaneous input of visual and tactile stimuli is the primary condition for inducing extensions of sensitivity and that movement is unnecessary. Generally speaking, psychological experiments have the advantage of controlling diverse conditions inherent in experiences as independent variables in experimental settings. They do not serve to describe lived experiences themselves but serve to elucidate conditions of certain experiences. In this sense, psychological experiments can inform theoretical investigations in phenomenology, especially in the process of identifying structures of lived experiences through imaginative variation.
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