Core Ideas
My research develops an integrated framework to understand how the human experience is structured through the interplay of embodiment, social cognition, and the self.
Rather than viewing the mind as an isolated information processor, I explore how our existence is co-constituted through our bodily engagement with the world and others. This framework moves beyond Cartesian dualism to show that the self is not a "thing" hidden inside the brain, but a dynamic process that emerges across three interconnected layers.
Through these pillars, I aim to clarify how the "Body of Wisdom" is formed and how we find our place within the shared Lifeworld.
1. Embodied Knowledge
A mode of knowing where the body itself knows how to act.
Overview
Embodied knowledge refers to a form of intelligence where the body responds directly to the environment without the need for conscious deliberation or mental representation. A familiar example is riding a bicycle or touch-typing; we perform these actions without verbalizing the procedures or visualizing the mechanics. The knowledge is "imprinted" in the body. In this context, the subject of knowing is not a detached "mind," but rather the minded-body or embodied-mind.
The Merleau-Pontian Origin: "Knowledge in the Hands"
This concept finds its roots in the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In Phenomenology of Perception (1945/2012), he describes the skill of touch-typing as "knowledge in the hands" (2012, p. 145). It is a specific type of habit that is neither a mere conditioned reflex nor a conscious intellectual map. Instead, it is a "knowledge of familiarity" (savoir de familiarité) that is forthcoming only through bodily effort and lived experience.
Beyond Cartesian Dualism
While mainstream cognitive science has often functioned under the shadow of Cartesian dualism—treating the mind as software and the body as interchangeable hardware (or even a "brain in a vat")—the concept of embodied knowledge challenges this reductionism.
Non-Representational Certainty: Unlike declarative knowledge, embodied knowledge does not require mental representations to be effective. We experience it with certainty through our engagement with the world.
Beyond Motor Skills: Embodied knowledge is not confined to physical maneuvers or athletic skills. It encompasses the breadth of human experience within the Lifeworld (Lebenswelt), through which we navigate our existence and social interactions.
2. Intercorporeality
The primordial, bodily coupling that enables us to perceive and understand others.
Overview
Intercorporeality is a notion proposed by Maurice Merleau-Ponty that offers an alternative way to understand social cognition. Instead of viewing the understanding of others as an intellectual puzzle—where one mind must "decode" another—intercorporeality focuses on the direct relationship between one's own body and the body of the other. It suggests that our most basic social connection is not mind-to-mind, but body-to-body.
The Perception-Action Loop: From Yawning to Smiling
Common experiences like contagious yawning or the involuntary urge to smile back at someone demonstrate this concept. When we perceive another person's action, it prompts a similar action (or the possibility of it) within ourselves. This is a perception-action loop where:
Perceiving the other’s action is "lived" by the self.
The self’s action reciprocally prompts a resonance in the other.
As Merleau-Ponty famously noted: "In perceiving the other, my body and his are coupled... This conduct which I am able only to see, I live somehow from a distance. I make it mine." (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, The Primacy of Perception, p. 118)
Beyond "Theory of Mind"
In mainstream psychology and cognitive science, social understanding is often explained through "Theory of Mind"—the cognitive capacity to represent the mental states of others. Intercorporeality challenges the necessity of this intellectual detour:
Direct Perception: We do not need to "infer" what someone feels; we grasp the meaning of their actions through our own motor capacity. To see an action is potentially to take it up.
Pre-conceptual Understanding: This ability is perceptual and sensorimotor rather than conceptual. It developmentally and theoretically precedes the higher-level cognitive skills often prioritized in traditional social cognition research.
3. Aida (Betweenness)
The relational field where self and other emerge through ongoing articulation.
Overview
Aida (betweenness) is a concept derived from Japanese psychopathology, particularly the work of Bin Kimura (1981, 1988), which I have further developed within the frameworks of phenomenology and enactivism. It suggests that "the self" is not an isolated entity locked inside an individual body or brain. Instead, the self is an ongoing process of articulation within a relational field—a "betweenness"—that exists between self and other, or between the body and the environment.
Two Dimensions of Aida
To understand the complexity of human existence, I distinguish between two inseparable dimensions of Aida:
The Enactive Dimension: This refers to the real-time, embodied coupling between individuals. It is the sensory-motor synchronization we experience during a conversation or a shared physical task.
The Historical Dimension: This is the sedimented field of linguistic, cultural, and social meanings. It provides the "pre-reflective" background that structures our experience even before we act.
The self emerges at the intersection of these two dimensions, acting as a dynamic "pattern" that is constantly re-organized through our interactions within this field.
A Relational Reinterpretation of the Self
By situating the self within Aida, we move beyond the traditional view of social cognition as "one mind reading another."
The Self as a Pattern: Building on Gallagher’s (2013, 2024) "Pattern Theory of Self," I propose that the self is not a thing, but a configuration of biological, psychological, and social features that are unified through Aida.
The Origin of Agency: In this view, agency and meaning do not start from within an individual; they arise from the "betweenness." We do not first exist and then interact; rather, we exist through and as the interaction itself.
