Shortly before, our new article was published on Philosophical Psychology.
Katsunori Miyahara and Shogo Tanaka (2023) "Narrative self-constitution as embodied practice" Philosophical Psychology, Online First.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09515089.2023.2286281
Here is the abstract.
Narrative views of the self argue that we constitute our self in self-narratives. Embodied views hold that our self is shaped through embodied experiences. In that case, what is the relation between embodiment and narrativity in the process of self-constitution? The question demands a clear definition of embodiment, but existing studies remains unclear on this point (section 2). We offer a correction to this situation by drawing on Merleau-Ponty’s analysis of the body that highlights its habituality. On this account, the body has an inherent tendency to cultivate an organization of habits through its history of engagement with the world (section 3). Next, we explore its role in narrative self-constitution by distinguishing between two aspects of the narrative self, the narrated I and the narrating I (section 4). We argue on phenomenological grounds that self-narratives are informed by bodily perspectives in both respects. Furthermore, a focus on the habituality of the body allows for a better explanation of self-constitution than those based on implicit self-narratives (section 5). For these phenomenological and theoretical reasons, we conclude that narrative self-constitution is an embodied and embedded practice (section 6).
It was a nice experience for me to write together with Katsunori Miyahara, who is also a Merleau-Ponty scholar. Collaborating with him, I tried to extend Merleau-Ponty's ideas on embodiment into the realm of narrativity.
Enjoy reading it.
