The paper on depersonalization that I published last year has become downloadable. Here is the link.
What is it Like to Be Disconnected from the Body?: A Phenomenological Account of Disembodiment in Depersonalization/ Derealization Disorder
https://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/imp/jcs/2018/00000025/f0020005/art00010#
As you can see in the abstract, I examined the experience of disembodiment in depersonalization disorder especially in terms of the minima self. It maybe of interest for those who are working on phenomenology of embodiment, phenomenological psychopathology and the philosophy of psychiatry.
Enjoy the paper!
S
Friday, November 1, 2019
Saturday, October 12, 2019
visiting Prague again
Thanks to the effort of my Czech colleagues, Martin Nitsche & Petr Urban, I am invited to give a talk in Prague again. I visited there for the first time three years ago to discuss in the workshop with philosopher Tom Sparrow.
This time I am going to give a talk on social cognition and intersubjectivity, especially on the concept of aida proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist, Bin Kimura. Here are my essays on aida in this blog.
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.com/search/label/Aida
For those who may be interested in my talk, here I share the abstract of my talk in Prague. My talk is scheduled for October 23rd.
SHOGO TANAKA & LASSE T. BERGMANN WORKSHOP
Title: On the normativity that emerges through embodied social interactions
Abstract:
The so-called interaction theory has brought rich insights into the debate on social cognition. Different from other major theories of mind, interaction theory describes the process of our social understanding focusing on the embodied interactions between the self and the other. In this presentation, I examine how the interaction theory can be further elaborated by drawing on the concept of aida, which was proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist Bin Kimura (1931-). Mainly describing an experience of music ensemble, Kimura explicates how the process of interpersonal interactions gain an autonomy as an emergent system. Beyond Kimura’s argument, I would like to show how this autonomy is experienced as a shared norm between the self and the other in social situations.
I look forward to feeling that special ambient of the city of Prague.
S
This time I am going to give a talk on social cognition and intersubjectivity, especially on the concept of aida proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist, Bin Kimura. Here are my essays on aida in this blog.
https://embodiedknowledge.blogspot.com/search/label/Aida
For those who may be interested in my talk, here I share the abstract of my talk in Prague. My talk is scheduled for October 23rd.
SHOGO TANAKA & LASSE T. BERGMANN WORKSHOP
Title: On the normativity that emerges through embodied social interactions
Abstract:
The so-called interaction theory has brought rich insights into the debate on social cognition. Different from other major theories of mind, interaction theory describes the process of our social understanding focusing on the embodied interactions between the self and the other. In this presentation, I examine how the interaction theory can be further elaborated by drawing on the concept of aida, which was proposed by a Japanese phenomenologist Bin Kimura (1931-). Mainly describing an experience of music ensemble, Kimura explicates how the process of interpersonal interactions gain an autonomy as an emergent system. Beyond Kimura’s argument, I would like to show how this autonomy is experienced as a shared norm between the self and the other in social situations.
S
Thursday, August 29, 2019
The Problem of Religious Experience
Dr. Olga Louchakova-Schwartz edited a new book, which I contributed a chapter to. It will be published in November.
Here's my chapter information.
[Chapter 2] Shogo Tanaka
Reconnecting the Self to the Divine: The Body’s Role in Religious Experience
It is the first time for me to consider religious experiences from a perspective of embodiment. Let me share the abstract with all of you. Enjoy it!
[Abstract]
I would like to explore spontaneous religious experiences, “spontaneous” meaning experiences that happen outside traditional religious beliefs or religious institutions and traditions but still have a religious nature. Such experiences include the feeling of unity with nature, experiences during peak performance in sports, or the sudden ecstatic sensation aroused by listening to a harmonious chorus, and so forth. Although they are not always recognized as “religious” for lack of a proper context, they are intense enough to awaken spiritual feelings. What is experienced as “something beyond the self” in these cases may be the foundational source of divinity underlying all sorts of religious activities. My goal is to further explore the experience of divinity from the perspective of the embodied self in terms of the sense of agency. James (1902) listed passivity as one of the four hallmarks of mystical experience: the person feels as if his or her actions are guided by the Other while maintaining a sense of agency. In my view, this state originates in the function of the body schema coordinating actions with the environment. In an unfamiliar situation, the body schema organizes new bodily actions beyond one’s intentions and expectations. Similarly, the body operates outside habit and as if following the Other’s will in spontaneous religious experiences.
Cheers,
S
Friday, May 3, 2019
to be published soon
A friend of mine, Luca Tateo invited me to contribute to the following book, which will be published soon.
Waldomiro J. Silva Filho & Luca Tateo (Eds.)
Thinking About Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology.
(Springer, Philosophical Studies Series)
https://www.springer.com/gb/book/9783030182656
I wrote a chapter that focuses on the bodily origin of self-reflection. Though one tends to presuppose that reflection is something purely mental as Descartes did, actually it has bodily origin. Here's the title of my chapter and the abstract. I hope you enjoy it.
Chapter 9: Bodily origin of self-reflection and its socially extended aspects
Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University)
My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.
Regards,
S
Waldomiro J. Silva Filho & Luca Tateo (Eds.)
Thinking About Oneself: The Place and Value of Reflection in Philosophy and Psychology.
(Springer, Philosophical Studies Series)
I wrote a chapter that focuses on the bodily origin of self-reflection. Though one tends to presuppose that reflection is something purely mental as Descartes did, actually it has bodily origin. Here's the title of my chapter and the abstract. I hope you enjoy it.
Chapter 9: Bodily origin of self-reflection and its socially extended aspects
Shogo Tanaka (Tokai University)
My aim in this chapter is to give a genetic account of self-reflection based on phenomenology and other related cognitive sciences. When dealing with the body in its relationship to the self, the traditional phenomenological approach emphasizes the subjective aspect of the body: “I” perceive the world through and from my body, and “I” act in the world through and with my body. In general, this embodied self is invoked to explain how the self is deeply rooted in pre-reflective actions. In this chapter, however, I attempt to elucidate how the embodied and pre-reflective self begins to reflect itself through bodily experiences. My view is that the origin of reflection is found not in contemplation by the detached mind, but in experiences of one’s own body as an object. One’s own body appears not only as a subject of perception and action but also as an intentional object (“body-as-object”). This ambiguity of the body precedes and underpins psychological experiences of self-reflection. In addition, the body-as-object appears as an object not only for oneself but also for others. Thus, self-reflection is not intrapsychically limited but has extended aspects in intersubjectivity and social cognition. Drawing on arguments by Husserl and Sartre, I explore experiences of empathy and social anxiety as socially extended experiences of self-reflection. This analysis suggests that it is only the self-reflective agent who can truly serve as the social agent and vice versa.
Regards,
S
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