According to the APA's dictionary, the theory of mind (ToM) is defined as:
[T]he ability to imagine or make deductions about the mental states of other individuals: What does the other individual know? What actions is that individual likely to take? Theory of mind is an essential component of attributing beliefs, intentions, and desires to others, specifically in order to predict their behavior.
The idea of ToM derives from Premack and Woodruff's 1978 article titled "Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?". They showed the short vieotape to a chimpanzee, in which a human actor was struggling in a cage to obtain bananas that were out of reach and inaccessible. And then they offered her a pair of the photographs, one constituting a solution to the problem (reaching out of the cage with a rod) and the other not. She could steadily choose the correct one. The chimpanzee seemed to be able to read the human actor's intention.
They wrote:
[I]n saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes mental states to himself and to others (either to conspecifics or to other species as well). A system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states are not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make predictions, specifically about the behavior of other organisms.
[Premack, D. G. & Woodruff, G. (1978). Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 1: 515-526. p.515]
In another part they also wrote:
[I]n assuming that other individuals want, think, believe, and the like, one infers states that are not directly observable and one uses these states anticipatorily, to predict the behavior of others as well as one's own. These inferences, which amount to a theory of mind, are, to our knowledge, universal in human adults.[ibid. p.525]
So, we can find two reasons here, for those they named 'theory' one's ability to infer another person's mental states and to predict his/her behavior.
1. mind is invisible or inaccessible
The mind is not directly observable. No one has direct access to the mind of another. One needs to infer what another knows, thinks, and wants based on a kind of theory.
2. behavior is readable or predictable based on ToM
But the same mind is readable based on the theory of mind. ToM, like other scientific theories or principles, makes us possible to predict the other's behavior.
The notion of ToM has these two presumptions in the background. But are they correct? The other mind is something invisible and hidden inside and what we can do is only to infer his/her mental states and to predict his/her behaviors based on an abstract theory?
It is sure that this is a variation of the classic problem of the other mind, which has been discussed in the philosophy after Descartes' mind-body dualism. If the mind should be separated from the body, we have to find the other's mind behind his/her actions. In order to understand the other, we need to infer the mental states from his/her movements of the body.
Tuesday, December 14, 2010
Wednesday, November 10, 2010
a symposium on Yasuo Yuasa
Next month, in the 20th conference of the Society for Mind-Body Science (December 11-12th), there is going to be held an academic symposium on Yasuo Yuasa.
December 11th, 2010
15:30-17:40
Rinri Bunka Center, Tokyo, JP
"Yasuo Yuasa's thought and mind-body science"
http://www.smbs.gr.jp/nenji2010.htm
Yasuo Yuasa (1925-2005) was one of the leading Japanese philosophers in the field of mind-body theory.
His thought encompasses traditional Buddhist thought, Japanese modern philosophy, phenomenology, psychoanalysis. In his main work "The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory", he presented a new framework to understand the importance of Asian mind-body theory and meditation practice from modern perspective.
Kasulis, who edited "The Body", writes as follows in his editor's introduction;
[T]hrough Yuasa's discovery, we can better grasp the nondualism central to so many Asian traditions. In conceiving an integration of body and mind, the various Eastern philosophers undercut such Western dichotomies as spirit-matter, subjectivity-objectivity, and theory-praxis. The Asian philosophers are not merely posing an alternative metaphysics. In fact, they are not doing metaphysics at all in the traditional Western sense. Instead, their task is what Yuasa, following C. G. Jung, calls metapsychics, an approach examined in detail by this book.
[Yuasa, Y. (1987) The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. State University of New York Press., p.2]
December 11th, 2010
15:30-17:40
Rinri Bunka Center, Tokyo, JP
"Yasuo Yuasa's thought and mind-body science"
http://www.smbs.gr.jp/nenji2010.htm
Yasuo Yuasa (1925-2005) was one of the leading Japanese philosophers in the field of mind-body theory.
His thought encompasses traditional Buddhist thought, Japanese modern philosophy, phenomenology, psychoanalysis. In his main work "The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory", he presented a new framework to understand the importance of Asian mind-body theory and meditation practice from modern perspective.
Kasulis, who edited "The Body", writes as follows in his editor's introduction;
[T]hrough Yuasa's discovery, we can better grasp the nondualism central to so many Asian traditions. In conceiving an integration of body and mind, the various Eastern philosophers undercut such Western dichotomies as spirit-matter, subjectivity-objectivity, and theory-praxis. The Asian philosophers are not merely posing an alternative metaphysics. In fact, they are not doing metaphysics at all in the traditional Western sense. Instead, their task is what Yuasa, following C. G. Jung, calls metapsychics, an approach examined in detail by this book.
[Yuasa, Y. (1987) The Body: Toward an Eastern Mind-Body Theory. State University of New York Press., p.2]
Friday, November 5, 2010
schizophrenic delusion and alien hand syndrome
It is well known that schizophrenic patients often report that their own actions are controlled by others or some outside forces. These actions can be trivial such as opening a door or writing letters. There are also more complicated types, such as "They inserted a computer in my brain. It makes me turn to the left". It is obvious that patients have a kind of delusion of control.
On the other hand, there is a similar neurological disorder which is known as 'alien hand' or 'anarchic hand' syndrome. It is associated with damage to the supplementary motor area in the cortex. The hand contralateral to the lesion performs goal-directed actions which are not intended by the patient. Sometimes the 'alien' hand interferes with the actions which the 'good' hand is trying to do.
[see Feinberg, T. E. (2001) Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self, Oxford U. P.]
Frith et al. compare these symptoms and point out the important difference between them as follows;
[T]he patient with an anarchic hand recognizes that his hand is performing actions that he has not intended....But he does not conclude that his hand is being controlled by alien forces. In contrast, the patient with delusions of control carries out the actions he intends....and yet, at the same time, he experiences these actions as being made for him by alien forces.
[Frith, C. D. et al. (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews 31: 357-363]
The difference is interesting enough. The patient with an alien hand don't have the sense of control of his 'alien' hand, but he still has the normal sense of ownership of it. Instead, the patient with schizophrenic delusion can control his movements but he doesn't have the normal sense of body ownership.
This suggests a lot of things to think about our sense of body ownership and our sense of agency for action.
On the other hand, there is a similar neurological disorder which is known as 'alien hand' or 'anarchic hand' syndrome. It is associated with damage to the supplementary motor area in the cortex. The hand contralateral to the lesion performs goal-directed actions which are not intended by the patient. Sometimes the 'alien' hand interferes with the actions which the 'good' hand is trying to do.
[see Feinberg, T. E. (2001) Altered Egos: How the Brain Creates the Self, Oxford U. P.]
Frith et al. compare these symptoms and point out the important difference between them as follows;
[T]he patient with an anarchic hand recognizes that his hand is performing actions that he has not intended....But he does not conclude that his hand is being controlled by alien forces. In contrast, the patient with delusions of control carries out the actions he intends....and yet, at the same time, he experiences these actions as being made for him by alien forces.
[Frith, C. D. et al. (2000). Explaining the symptoms of schizophrenia: Abnormalities in the awareness of action. Brain Research Reviews 31: 357-363]
The difference is interesting enough. The patient with an alien hand don't have the sense of control of his 'alien' hand, but he still has the normal sense of ownership of it. Instead, the patient with schizophrenic delusion can control his movements but he doesn't have the normal sense of body ownership.
This suggests a lot of things to think about our sense of body ownership and our sense of agency for action.
Tuesday, September 14, 2010
The 'minimal' self
Shaun Gallagher states that it is possible to simplify various notions of the self into two categories; the 'minimal self' and the 'narrative self'.
[Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. in Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 4(1).]
Narrative self is the coherent self that is constituted with a past and a future in the various stories that we and others tell about ourselves. It is a kind of ordinary self that we experience in our daily lives.
The minimal self is a self which is composed of minimal factors; all of the unessential features are stripped away. It is the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. It is the 'I' who is experiencing 'now-here'.
The minimal self has the two aspects; the sense of agency and the sense of ownership. The ownership is the sense that it is my body that is moving, and the agency is the sense that I am the initiator or source of the action. They are indistinguishable in the normal experience of willed action. We have both senses at the same time.
But in the case of involuntary action (e.g. someone moved my hand), it is possible to distinguish between them. I have the sense that I am the one who is moving, but I don't have the sense that I am controlling the movement. That is, I have the sense of ownership but I don't have the sense of agency.
It would be interesting to research the impairments, alterations or lesions of these two basic senses in various body awareness disturbances; phantom limbs, asomatognosia, anosognosia, depersonalization, hemiplegia, etc. It will bring a light to the relation between the body and the self.
[Gallagher, S. (2000). Philosophical conceptions of the self: implications for cognitive science. in Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 4(1).]
Narrative self is the coherent self that is constituted with a past and a future in the various stories that we and others tell about ourselves. It is a kind of ordinary self that we experience in our daily lives.
The minimal self is a self which is composed of minimal factors; all of the unessential features are stripped away. It is the consciousness of oneself as an immediate subject of experience, unextended in time. It is the 'I' who is experiencing 'now-here'.
The minimal self has the two aspects; the sense of agency and the sense of ownership. The ownership is the sense that it is my body that is moving, and the agency is the sense that I am the initiator or source of the action. They are indistinguishable in the normal experience of willed action. We have both senses at the same time.
But in the case of involuntary action (e.g. someone moved my hand), it is possible to distinguish between them. I have the sense that I am the one who is moving, but I don't have the sense that I am controlling the movement. That is, I have the sense of ownership but I don't have the sense of agency.
It would be interesting to research the impairments, alterations or lesions of these two basic senses in various body awareness disturbances; phantom limbs, asomatognosia, anosognosia, depersonalization, hemiplegia, etc. It will bring a light to the relation between the body and the self.
Saturday, April 17, 2010
Rubber Hand Illusion
The rubber hand illusion is a well known somatosensory illusion, which was reported by Botvinick and Cohen in 1998. It has become almost classic in the research of body awareness.
[Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature.]
In the experiment, the participant's real hand is hidden out of sight. Instead, a life-sized rubber hand is placed in front of the participant. The experimenter uses two brushes to stroke the real hand and the rubber hand synchronously. After a short period, most of participants start to feel the touch in the position of rubber hand and experience as if the rubber hand is the real hand.
from: scienceblogs.com
Ehrsson tested the illusion in four conditions to manipulate the feeling of ownership of the rubber hand.
[Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C., Passingham, R. E. (2004). That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb. Science.]
1. Synchronous and Congruent: stroking synchronously the rubber hand and the real hand,
putting the rubber hand aligned with the real hand.
2. Asynchronous and Congruent: stroking asynchronously, the rubber hand aligned with the real hand.
3. Synchronous and Incongruent: stroking synchronously,
the rubber hand rotated 180 degrees pointing toward the participant.
4. Asynchronous and Incongruent: stroking asynchronously, the rubber hand rotated 180 degrees.
As is expected, the participants felt the most strong illusion in the first condition (synchronous and congruent). The touching stimuli should be synchronous and the orientation of the rubber hand need to be congruent with that of the real hand.
I guess, the position of the rubber hand must be in the circle of possible movements to create the illusion. If the rubber hand is outside the movability of the real hand (very far, rotated conversely, hung upside down, etc.) the participants will not be able to feel the illusion.
Illusion is the possible perceptions, as perception is the possible action.
[Botvinick, M. & Cohen, J. (1998). Rubber hands 'feel' touch that eyes see. Nature.]
In the experiment, the participant's real hand is hidden out of sight. Instead, a life-sized rubber hand is placed in front of the participant. The experimenter uses two brushes to stroke the real hand and the rubber hand synchronously. After a short period, most of participants start to feel the touch in the position of rubber hand and experience as if the rubber hand is the real hand.
Ehrsson tested the illusion in four conditions to manipulate the feeling of ownership of the rubber hand.
[Ehrsson, H. H., Spence, C., Passingham, R. E. (2004). That's my hand! Activity in premotor cortex reflects feeling of ownership of a limb. Science.]
1. Synchronous and Congruent: stroking synchronously the rubber hand and the real hand,
putting the rubber hand aligned with the real hand.
2. Asynchronous and Congruent: stroking asynchronously, the rubber hand aligned with the real hand.
3. Synchronous and Incongruent: stroking synchronously,
the rubber hand rotated 180 degrees pointing toward the participant.
4. Asynchronous and Incongruent: stroking asynchronously, the rubber hand rotated 180 degrees.
As is expected, the participants felt the most strong illusion in the first condition (synchronous and congruent). The touching stimuli should be synchronous and the orientation of the rubber hand need to be congruent with that of the real hand.
I guess, the position of the rubber hand must be in the circle of possible movements to create the illusion. If the rubber hand is outside the movability of the real hand (very far, rotated conversely, hung upside down, etc.) the participants will not be able to feel the illusion.
Illusion is the possible perceptions, as perception is the possible action.
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